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The programme budget 1986-1987 of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean provided for the 
preparation of a study on countertrade. As a result of that 
decision, the following countries were selected for study: 
Jamaica, Guyana, Suriname, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. A 
questionnaire was designed for the purpose of collecting and 
analysing the data that was to be obtained from field missions.
Field work was completed for Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
The present report discusses countertrade in general, 
examining various aspects of it. This is followed by an analysis 
of the practices and policies in the countries for which field 
mission was undertaken and an examination of the viability and 
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Countertrade has been defined as "an international commercial 
operation in the framework of which the seller has to accept in 
partial or total settlement of his deliveries in the supply of 
products coming from the purchasing country". The term describes 
a whole range of trade obligations between two or more parties. 
These obligations are linked: sales are linked to purchases or 
purchases to sales. In many instances, governments undertake 
countertrade themselves. Where they do not do so directly, they 
pursue policies that encourage the practice or make it a 
requirement for trade.
The practice of "countertrading" is an ancient one. It goes 
back to early forms of commerce when there was a direct exchange 
of goods without recourse to financial settlement or transfer of 
funds. In relatively m o d e m  times, there was increasing recourse 
to one form of it, barter, because of the disastrous economic 
consequences of the Great Depression, the international liquidity 
crisis, the secular decline in commodity prices and export earnings 
of developing countries, the breakdown in the gold standard and the 
competitive devaluation of currencies, especially in third world 
countries.
The oil crisis of 1973 saw a sudden upsurge in the use of 
countertrade. Many industrialised nations, notably Japan and some 
member countries of the European Economic Community concluded 
countertrade deals with several oil-producing states in order to 
ensure essential supplies of that commodity. Developing countries 
too concluded deals. The poorest of them, the least developed 
countries, negotiated deals at prices below what were then 
considered high world market prices. These deals mitigated 
somewhat the external debt burden of these countries. But the 
global recession that followed, high interest rates and 
protectionism continued to aggravate the acute balance-of-payments 
difficulties of these developing countries.
Governments in the industrialised market-economy countries 
pursue forms of countertrade such as off-set, buy-back or 
counterpurchase. They sometimes impose one of these forms of 
countertrade on their foreign suppliers as part of their bilateral 
trade requirements. The technique of "off-set" is the most 
commonly used form of countertrade for them. Among nations that 
have used it are Holland, Canada, Spain, France and Switzerland and 
the U.S.A.
Business firms in the industrialised market-economy countries 
are usually reluctant to engage in countertrade. They consider i t  
a complicated and risky business. However, their views are
1 Q.E.C.D. East-West Trade: Recent developments in
countertrade (Paris. 19811 p.9
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changing as countertrade is increasingly being handled by 
specialist trading firms. Large trading companies such as Cargill, 
Andre, March Rich, Merban and Kaines are including countertrade in 
their commodity sales services. In addition to these are the three 
largest countertrading firms in the world: Phibros. Centro
Internationale Hendelsbank and Metallgesellschaft (MGS).
For the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China, 
countertrade is very important. In these countries, all foreign 
trade, including countertrade is managed and directed by their 
governments. The practice of countertrade is more integrated into 
the overall structure of the economy. Governments in these 
countries usually favour forms of countertrade such as buy-backs 
and counterpurchases. Through buy-backs they are able to transfer 
western technology to their industries; through counterpurchase, 
they are able to obtain supplies of commodities from developing 
countries.
Developing countries have been said to pursue countertrade 
for a variety of reasons. Countries such as India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Nigeria and 
Jamaica have considerable experience in the business. Policies 
have been devised, institutions created and laws enacted all to 
facilitate the practice of countertrade. Whilst most of the deals 
struck are counterpurchase deals, a number of new transactions are 
notably for buy-backs and other compensation agreements. Many 
developing countries have envisaged countertrade as a means of 
fostering regional economic co-operation and integration. In Latin 
America, the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) has 
been the main regional proponent of facilitating regional 
countertrade. In the English-speaking Caribbean, the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) would naturally fulfill that role. similar 
efforts exist elsewhere in Asia and Africa. For better or for 
worse, these countries have embraced countertrade.
Estimates of the global volume of countertrade are hard to 
come by. These range from a low of 1% by the International 
Monetary Fund which discourages countertrade to about 50% in press 
reports. At present, over 90 countries are involved in 
countertrade as compared with 15 ten years ago. The increase in 
numbers is no doubt substantial but as to exact data on volume and 
value there is no means of collecting it. Secrecy surrounds deals,
2 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, September 1987, No.53
3 UNCTAD/ST/ECDC/32 ? 30 March 1987 pp. 3-4
* This view was expressed by officials during discussions at 
the CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana in 1987.
5 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, op. Cit p.37
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particularly those negotiated in the private sector. Also, many 
governments do not record linked bilateral trade as a separate 
entry in their national accounts. Companies in industrialised 
market-economy countries do not have to report countertrade 
transactions as a separate category in their disclosure 
statements. The net effect of all this is that trading volumes
and trading partners are a secret.




RATIONALE FOR CURRENT COUNTERTRADE POLICIES
In the previous chapter, reference was made to three groups 
of countries that engaged in countertrade:
(a) developed market-economy countries
(b) socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China and
(c) the developing countries.
This grouping is entirely arbitrary and does not make value 
judgements on the political systems within which countertrade is 
practiced.
In developed market-economy countries, governments impose 
countertrade requirements (usually off-sets) in order to favour 
certain industries. Such action could be part of governments' 
industrial policy in support of particular industries or the export 
sector. It could also be part of government's policy to reduce 
unemployment as would be the case where certain off-set deals are 
mandated or imposed.
There is yet another reason for countertrade. Western 
governments that wish to secure their access to supplies of 
critical raw materials have instituted so-called "develop-for- 
import" schemes. Under these schemes, Western suppliers contract 
with a developing country government or commercial entity, to 
invest in or transfer technology to the said country or commercial 
entity in exchange for guaranteed shipments. These types of deals 
are usually implemented through a combination of policy decisions 
and export financing regulations. For instance, in 1982, the 
French government provided export loans on easy terms to a French 
firm exporting aluminum refining machinery to India. The terms of 
the loan required the French firm to receive alumina shipments from 
India in partial payment for the equipment. This is a classic 
buy-back deal.
Firms in developed market-economy countries have gone into 
countertrade where there is sufficient reason to believe that they 
can benefit from nominal pricing arrangements. Many firms have 
used countertrade to disguise or falsify prices or quantities in 
international trade. Invariably soft commodities are swapped for
7 Welt, Leo G.B. Countertrade. Euromoney Publications, London,
1985.
8 WALSH, J. Resources Policy Journal December, 1982 p.4
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capital goods. For example, oil can be swapped for aircraft or 
agricultural machinery. Imaginative invoicing and creative 
accounting distorts the true value of the exchange. Such a 
practice does occur in conventional trade. In countertrade, it is 
more difficult to detect. Where the home governments of these 
firms offer export credit facilities to support the deals, they, 
in effect, are offering discounts to their trading partners without 
the risk of violating commodity agreements or GATT protocols.
Companies, notably banks, in some market-economy countries 
have embraced countertrade as a means of reducing debts incurred 
to them by some third world nations. A  case in point is Peru. 
One of that country's largest creditors, First Interstate Bank of 
California with a total exposure of $100m, raised the possibility 
of payment in kind. In October of 1987, First Interstate drew up 
a contract for the payment of $45 million in working capital debt 
with Peruvian products during 1987 and 1988. This initiative has 
caused the Peruvian authorities to develop a set of guidelines and 
procedures for payment in kind. The deals, they say, should be 
based on incrementality, involving non-traditional exports, be 
labour intensive and consistent with the government's goal of 
decentralising the economy.
Finally, firms in market-economy countries use countertrade 
to expand their business. Trading houses, investment and 
commercial banks have all developed countertrade departments to 
both arrange and finance countertrade deals on behalf of major 
corporations. In general, banks will not accept to do deals unless 
large sums of money were involved (generally over US$300,000). A 
transaction involving smaller amounts will be accepted if it is 
part of a guaranteed repeat sale. The Sogo Shoshas of Japan 
illustrate the involvement of large conglomerates in countertrade. 
The Mitsubishi Corporation, the Mitsui Corporation and the Marubeni 
Corporation, after suffering revenue losses in 1987, started to 
look for ways to boost business. By leveraging off a massive 
volume of global trade, these corporations found that they were in 
an excellent position to act as middlemen in countertrade deals. 
Although countertrade deals represent only a small percentage of 
their total volume of business, there have been profitable billion 
dollar deals for them.
The Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China have 
without doubt dominated the countertrade scene for many years. 
These countries operate state trading organisations or agencies 
that consider countertrade to be ideologically and operationally 
compatible with their systems of central planning. Foreign trade , 
is conceived as a means of balancing supply and demand within an
9 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, October 1987, No.54
10 Trade Finance: Euromoney Publications, April 1988, No. 60
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overall macro-economic framework. Countertrade is an essential 
instrument in achieving that balance.
A primary reason for countertrade policies in the Socialist 
countries of Eastern Europe and China is the need to up-grade and 
modernize their manufacturing industries through access to state- 
of-the-art technology. Countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania and Poland engage in massive buy-back deals in the hope 
that technological improvements and innovations that go with the 
licensed product will help improve their industrialisation plans. 
To a lesser extent, this might be true for the U.S.S.R. The 
Chinese too see countertrade as a means of encouraging investment 
in plant and equipment, of providing technical training services 
and promoting joint ventures. All of these countries hope that 
through countertrade mandated co-production and buy-backs, they 
will have access to western know-how and management techniques.
There are yet other attractions. Countertrade is seen by the 
socialist countries and China as a means of penetrating non- 
traditional markets and international marketing networks. This, 
they hope, will eventually lead to a diversification and an 
expansion of their exports. After concluding a countertrade deal, 
these countries are able to sell directly to the same markets where 
their deals were struck. China, for example, considers 
countertrade as an opportunity to introduce new Chinese products 
to western export markets. This is in keeping with the new 
economic reformist policies that have been underway there over the 
last eight years.
Lastly, the socialist countries and China mandate countertrade 
as a means of conserving foreign exchange and reducing their 
balance of payment deficits. This rationale is also cited by 
developing countries. Reference to their case will be made later.
The centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe use the city 
of Vienna, Austria as a place to arrange sophisticated multi-tier 
package deals that involve banks, trading companies, foreign trade 
agencies and finance houses. These deals include various forms of 
barter, compensation and counterpurchase, pre-export financing, 
forfaiting, cross-border leasing and private market insurance. The 
object and intent in all the financial dealings that are undertaken 
on behalf of the socialist countries is to ensure that in their 
trade with the West, much needed foreign exchange is earned and 
conserved.
The outlook for countertrade in the socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe and China is changing. Countertrade business has 
shrunk as these countries increasingly want to keep items that they 
countertrade for domestic consumption. Also, the CMEA countries 
are now credit-worthy and they find it cheaper and easier to
7
finance their imports. China seems to be concentrating more on 
joint venture programmes rather than on counterpurchase or barter. 
Traditional countertrade specialists such as March Rich S.A., 
Phibros and Merban are all finding business tough-going. Optimism 
and jobs have dwindled as fewer profitable deals are concluded. 
A relatively new phenomenon that has developed is the 
counterpurchasing of services rather than goods in fulfillment of 
countertrade obligations. The countertrade specialists seem to 
have gone into trade finance and financial services.
For developing countries, the foreign exchange requirement 
has been advanced as the strongest rationale for countertrade. 
Many of them have accumulated large foreign debts. In addition, 
they continue to experience severe shortages and declining prices 
for their primary products. They see countertrade as a response 
to all this. In spite of mushrooming external debts and liquidity 
constraints, these countries are able to continue trading through 
countertrade. Countertrade does not increase their overall 
indebtedness nor does it deplete their foreign exchange reserves 
which may be earmarked for debt-servicing.
Another major factor in favour of countertrade is that it 
enables developing countries to improve their marketing 
intelligence, develop new direct sales, especially for their non- 
traditional exports and dispose of excess supplies of commodities 
via "incremental" markets. Many developing countries stipulate, 
as part of their countertrade operations, that the transactions be 
additional to normal trade. Others simply consider deals as trade 
that would have taken place anyway and do not insist on the 
principle of "incrementality" or "additionality".
Many developing countries have expressed through GATT and 
UNCTAD their dissatisfaction at the protectionist barriers which 
have been erected in the markets of the developed countries. Many 
also complain at the strict rules of origin criteria that have been 
stipulated by many developed countries in their programmes for 
preferential treatment of goods from developing countries. Whilst 
attempts are being made within GATT and UNCTAD to discourage 
protectionism and liberalise preferential trade agreements, 
developing countries feel that they can secure markets through 
countertrade and benefit from the importation of spare parts, 
materials, pharmaceuticals and machinery without cash transfers.
Some developing countries, particularly the large ones like 
India, Argentina, Brazil and Nigeria use countertrade as a means 
of obtaining up-to-date technology. Their state trading 
organisations display considerable market power in their 
countertrade negotiations. For example, India, which still does
11 Trade Finance : Euromoney Publications, March 1987. No.47
p.53
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not bave an official policy on countertrade, has two agencies - 
the State Trading Company (STC) and the Minerals and Metals 
Corporation (MMTC) - through which countertrade deals are arranged. 
Together, they flex sufficient muscle as buyers. Their total 
imports fox 1986-87 has been placed upwards of Rupees 40 bn (US 
$3.1 bn).12 In addition to this market power, the corporations are 
bolstered by the Ministry of Commerce regulations stipulating that 
all bulk imports, ship imports, oil imports and all capital goods 
imports of value exceeding Rupees 100m (US $7.6m) would be governed 
by countertrade. This is enough to ensure importation of good 
quality products and high grade technology.
For many developing countries, countertrade operates as 
selective devaluation. The selective devaluation operates on a 
case by case basis for specific countertrade operations. In 
developing countries where exchange rates are overvalued, the 
discount that is applied to a countertrade deal, in effect, is a 
devaluation as the goods are exchanged at a rate below the official 
exchange rate. If several deals are struck and they carry several 
discount rates, these rates in effect become multitier exchange 
rates. Developing countries can therefore exchange goods and 
services at different rates without resorting to changes in their 
exchange rates. It is useful to note that the International 
Monetary Fund is quite averse to this method of exchange rate 
management. The Fund believes that this practice of selective 
devaluation through countertrade deals masks real long-term 
economic and balance-of-payments problems that need to be resolved 
by both monetary and fiscal policies. Many developing countries, 
notably in Latin America, continue to use countertrade in the 
manner described above, the position of the IMF notwithstanding.




THE CASE AGAINST COUNTERTRADE
The main argument against countertrade has been referred to 
somewhat obliquely. It is that it is complicated, risky and costly 
business. Countertrade is complicated because most of the deals 
are tailor-made to suit the needs and limitations of suppliers and 
clients. Many governments, particularly those in the third world 
that engage in countertrade, do not have sufficient previous 
experience. What experience they have gained has been mainly with 
other developing countries. The argument further states that 
because of the lack of experience of these governments, regulations 
and approval processes governing countertrade tend to shift 
unpredictably. They are often cumbersome.
In addition to deals being complicated, they tend to cost too 
much. The high costs are as a result of disposing goods under non- 
optimal market conditions coupled with handling, storage and 
transportation costs as well as commissions for intermediaries. 
When governments use trading houses, especially the big established 
ones, the costs are even higher. Trading houses charge a single 
account composed of two elements:
a) the subsidy or discount to be passed on to the ultimate 
buyer;
b) the commission which would include finance charges, out- 
of-pocket expenses and a profit.
Commissions are calculated as a percentage of deals. They could 
range from 1 - 5 % .
There are other costs which have to be considered when deals 
are struck. They are lega%*^¡administrative and technical. 
Countertrade contracts tend to be concluded after lengthy 
negotiations. Normally, three separate contracts are involved in 
a deal: the principal contract under which the first party sells 
goods or services to the second party, the counterpurchase 
contract, and the protocol. A number of private international law 
issues are usually resolved. These relate to the terms of payment 
for the principal contract, the obligations to counterpurchase, 
performance or non-performance of a contract, arbitration and the 
settlement of disputes.
13 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, April 1988, No. 60
p.29
1 ̂ UNCTAD/ST/ECDC/32: Countertrade Policies and Practices bv
selected African and Latin American countries.
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The administrative costs range from the setting-up of a focal 
point within government to co-ordinate countertrade matters to the 
physical handling of large quantities of the goods that are to be 
countertraded. Usually, it is a state trading corporation or a 
department of government. Elaborate lists have to be drawn up for 
goods that are to be countertraded. Appended to these lists are 
guidelines or ministerial directives that need to be followed in 
order to effect a countertrade deal. Reference to this has been 
made in the case of India and Peru in the previous chapter. Banks 
have recognised the need to control administrative costs through 
the setting-up of countertrade units. Citicorp, Bank of America, 
Barclays Bank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust have all established 
units to better serve their countertrade clients.
A number of secondary hidden costs are associated with 
countertrade. The risk involved in the uncertainties that relate 
to deliveries in terms of product quality (particularly perishable 
goods) and time is a cost. Economy-wide costs come from private 
distortions associated with countertrade. The effect of selective 
devaluation associated with discounts on deals could create export 
incentives and they might not necessarily be the most efficient in 
the economy. These same "shadow rates" affect goods imported under 
countertrade. The effect of a tax on these goods is borne by a 
large number of users. Any benefit that results only occurs to a 
small group of producers of the exported products. 5
There is yet another argument against countertrade - it is 
that it tends to limit the incentives for autonomous marketing by 
state trading enterprises. Instead of exploring new marketing 
avenues and gearing themselves to meet export challenges, they 
settle for govemment-to-government deals, secure in the knowledge 
that their exports will find ready importers. They loose the 
opportunity to gain valuable trading experience which knowledge of 
markets confers. In no time, the argument runs, many of the state 
trading corporations begin to lose money and have to rely on 
massive state subventions to stay in business.
Whilst the above argument is somewhat true, it tends to blame 
state trading corporations for inefficiencies which might not 
necessarily be limited to countertrade. These corporations 
themselves could be poorly constituted and administered and as a 
result they would perform badly whether or not they do business in 
countertrade. Many state trading corporations in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America/Caribbean seem not to be able to do well even in 
direct market operations and as a result, they have to develop new 
trading channels including countertrade.
15 UNCTAD/ ST/ ECDC/ 27: Countertrade - experiences of some
Latin'America countries.
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Another set of pointers against countertrade has to do with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Fund discourages countertrade and 
advises members that "the objective of countertrade could be 
achieved more efficiently through appropriate fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies”. The Fund believes that economy-wide 
price distortions, misallocation of resources, selective 
devaluations based on deals, inappropriate fiscal incentives for 
exports and the high opportunity costs of non-monetary 
transactions, in the long run, are harmful to the economies of 
countries that engage in countertrade on a routine basis. 
Obviously, the Fund would rather that countries that have reason 
to resort to countertrade use Fund-type measures to correct 
persistent macro-economic problems rather than employ non-economic 
measures that mask the need for corrective action.
Some countries, notably in the developing world, consider the 
Fund's view of countertrade too rigid. They feel that a number of 
countertrade transactions have offered them trade credits, 
particularly where conventional sources have dried up. They claim 
that the condition of additionally is sufficient guarantee to 
ensure that countertrade would enhance their total export trade and 
would not encourage substitution for direct market sales.
The situation with GATT is different. There, the problem is 
essentially a legal one. Since there is no legal regime that 
governs countertrade, the one that comes closest to serving this 
function is the GATT. The GATT rules do not mention countertrade 
or even treat it indirectly. Interpretation of the intent of 
economic principles in the GATT is what is sometimes used as a 
rationale. But trade lawyers argue that specific GATT articles 
prohibit countertrade. They cite Article XI which prescribes all 
prohibition applied to the imports of a contracting party. The 
buy-back provisions which require a foreign exporter to purchase 
local goods as a condition for his or her export is considered 
prohibitive under Article XI.
Two other articles are worth mentioning. Article XVII 
concerns state enterprises. They are required under GATT to act 
according to principles of non-discriminatory treatment and to make 
purchases and sales in accordance with commercial practices. 
Article XXIII prohibits action which impedes any objective of GATT. 
Since countertrade interferes with normal free-market trade, it is 
said to be contrary to GATT rules. 7
Developing countries that are engaged in countertrade have 
used Article XII on import restrictions in order to ease up on
16 Welt, L.G. Countertradef Euromoney Publications, 1985
17 Welt, L.G. Countertrade. Euromoney Publications, 1985
foreign exchange constraints and Article XVIII on quantitative 
restrictions to justify their use of countertrade. As far as they 





Countertrade for many countries that practice it is an ad hoc 
activity. General policy guidelines do not exist. Deals are 
struck on a case-by-case basis though ministerial directives are 
used to safeguard vital national interests. The mechanics of 
countertrade vary according to local conditions, the goods to be 
countertraded and the current priorities of the parties concerned. 
Emerging out of all this has been a series of descriptions which 
characterise the types of countertrade technique used. This 
chapter will discuss them.
Barter
Barter has been defined as the exchange of goods between two 
or more parties under a single contract with no money changing 
hands. 8 In barter deals, there are no letters of credit. Parties 
to the barter deal obtain from their respective bank "performance 
bonds" which ensure that in the case of default, the defaulting 
partner will compensate the other party in hard currency. A single 
contract covers the flow of goods between the two parties to the 
barter deal. Usually, the supply of the main products to be 
countertraded is held up until some revenue has been generated from 
selling bartered goods.
This form of countertrade is used widely in Africa and Latin 
America/Caribbean. In 1987, Libya offered 500,000 tons of crude 
oil to Uganda under an oil for commodities deal. Uganda supplied 
coffee, maize and beans in quantities that would pay for the oil. 
This deal was additional to a much more complicated and larger 
barter deal involving Italy*s oil company AGIP and the Governments 
of OMAN and Tanzania. International oil companies were upset at 
this deal between Libya and Uganda. They felt that they were 
excluded from a market by cheaper oil from Libya.
In the Caribbean, Jamaica signed a barter deal with the United 
States Department of Agriculture in 1982. The deal involved an 
exchange of 9,115 metric tons of dairy products for 400,000 tons
18 Welt, L.G. Countertrade. Euromoney Publications, London 
1985 pp 10 -11
19 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, Sept. 1987, No. 53
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of bauxite.20 A sample of the above agreement is provided in Annex 
II of this report. Figure 1 shows how a typical barter deal works.
100% Goods






The following is a model list of provisions that might be 
included in a barter contract, setting out the major provisions to 




acknowledgement of obligation of first party to provide and 
accept goods
acknowledgement of obligation of second party to provide and 
accept goods 
first party goods
- description of goods, specifications
- quantity




“ documents, documentary transfer 
second party goods
- description of goods, specifications
- quantity




- documents, documentary transfer
20 Information supplied on mission, June 1986. Also quoted 
in L.G. Welt's Countertrade. op. cit
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bank guarantees providing for full payment in the event of the 
non-performance of one party 
guarantee of quality, quality control 
right to inspect
determination and settlement of claims
penalties (or other agreed upon arrangements) in the event of:
- late delivery
- delivery of non-conforming goods
- failure to deliver
- force majeure
- arbitration
- choice of law.
Counterpurchase
Counterpurchase is perhaps by far the most commonly used 
countertrade technique. Usually, there are two separate contracts 
"linked" under a protocol. One agreement covers the export sales 
of a firm whilst the other the purchase from the trading partner. 
The protocol that links the two usually sets out penalties and 
procedures for non-performance, financing arrangements and risk 
guarantees. The two sales agreements are negotiated and executed 
simultaneously.
The first agreement in the counterpurchase deal is usually a 
standard contract that sets out information relating to the 
quality, quantity, time and place of delivery of the specified 
product. It also sets out the price of the product and the terms 
of payment, usually in hard currency. The second agreement sets 
out the obligation by the first party to purchase goods from the 
second party. This is usually a much broader agreement. In it, 
the first party would be required to select from a wide selection 
of goods available for export from the second party and would allow 
the first party to fulfill its purchase obligation with^Ln a 
specified time period after the execution of the agreements.
Banks are largely responsible for the separation of contracts 
in counterpurchase deals. They usually view counterpurchase deals 
as complex and risky. They normally like to have the two separate 
independent contracts so that they could evaluate their clients 
(usually the second party in the counterpurchase deal) on their 
own merits. They are reluctant to extend credit to someone where 
ability to repay is dependent on expected earnings from a 
counterpurchase transaction.
Counterpurchase deals typically last from 6 months to 3 years. 
Some do go beyond this period. A new variant has recently been
21 Report on countertrade workshop: Caribbean Association of 
Industry and Commerce, July 1986.
introduced. Reference has already been made to the practice of 
counterpurchasing services as part of a countertrade deal. Types 
of services offered are usually office and display space, 
construction, research and advertising.
A recent counterpurchase deal has been reported in trade 
journals. In 1987, Standard Chartered Bank arranged a deal between 
Zimbabwe and Egypt whereby Zimbabwean tobacco was sent to Egypt and 
in turn, a wide variety of distressed Egyptian products was taken 
out. These were then sold in the European market and the proceeds 
used to purchase high priority plastic raw materials required by 
Zimbabwe's packaging industry.22 Figure 2 illustrates a
counterpurchase deal.
Fig. 2
The above figure shows the workings of a simple 
counterpurchase contract (parallel contract). Two variations of 
it are sometimes followed. These are known as advanced purchases 
and linked deals. An example of a counterpurchase deal between 
Guyana and Barbados will be referred to when the policies and 
practices of the two countries are discussed later.
The following is a model list of provisions that might be 
included in a counterpurchase contract. This list is not 
exhaustive, it is merely indicative; At all times, legal advice 
should be sought before contracts are signed.
22 Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce; Report on
countertrade workshop July 1986.





- acknowledgement of obligation to purchase goods
- description of goods, specifications
- quantity




- documents, documentary transfer
- guarantee of quality, quality control
- right to inspect
- right to neutral surveyor
- determination arid settlement of claims
- penalties, remedies (or other agreed upon arrangements) 
in the event of:
-  late delivery
-  delivery of non-confirming goods
-  failure to deliver
- force majeure
- arbitration




- acknowledgement of obligation to counterpurchase goods
- list of available goods
- specifications, description, quality
- quantity of counterpurchase
- price, terms of payment, guarantee thereof
- time period in which to fulfill obligation






- documents, documentary transfer
- guarantee of quality, quality control
- right to inspect
- right to neutral surveyor
- determination and settlement of claims
- first party penalties, remedies
- cancellation of first sales agreement
18
- transferability of counterpurchase agreement
- force majeure
- arbitration
- choice of law
Compensation (or buv-backl
The compensation or buy-back transaction consists of the sale 
of plant, machinery, equipment, technology or complete 
manufacturing processes to a second party with a contractual 
commitment on his/her part to buy back goods that are produced by 
or derived from the equipment in the original sale. Compensation 
arrangements usually take several years, are more complicated than 
counterpurchase deals and their values larger. Arrangements could 
range from 3 years to sometimes 25 years depending on the magnitude 
of the project and the start-up time associated with construction 
of factory or plant.
As with counterpurchase arrangements, compensation is 
organised by means of two separate agreements, linked by a 
protocol. The reasons for this are similar to those for 
counterpurchase deals. The protocol, however, assumes greater 
significance. It ensures that counterdeliveries are produced with 
the technology and equipment delivered in the original sale.
There are two points worth mentioning about compensation. The 
first party to the deal would normally exercise sufficient care in 
respect of sections of the terms of the agreement relating to 
equipment supply and technology transfer. This would protect its 
international competitive position. It would also enable the 
second party to undertake production of the buy-back goods without 
getting entangled in legal problems associated with industrial 
property rights. The second point is that compensation agreements 
do result in saturation of markets. These markets are sometimes 
the same ones in which the firm selling the buy-back product is 
also trying to sell its own similar product. This leads-to dumping 
and other practices to ensure minimum sales. Example of a buy-back 
deal has been referred to already (p. IS).
23 Leo G. Welt, Countertrade. op. cit. p.15
Below is figure 3 which illustrates the deal. 24
Below also is a check list of a model compensation contract. 




2. Primary Sales Agreement
- parties
- recitals
- acknowledgement of 
obligation to purchase 
equipment/technology
- description of equipment/ 
technology, specifications
- price, terms of 
payment
- method of payment, 
guarantee thereof
- time, terms and other 
details regarding delivery
- additional provisions 
related to specific aspects 
of agreement
- penalties (or other
such as performance of 
equipment/technology, roles 
played by employees, consultants 
and technical advisors, and 





- documents, documentary 
transfer
- guarantee of quality, quality 
control
- right to inspect
- right to neutral surveyor
- determination and settlement 
of claims
- marketing restrictions
«/. L.G. Welt, Countertrade. op.cit. p.15
25 Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce; Report of 
Countertrade Workshop, op. cit p.16
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agreed upon arrangements) 
in the event of:
- late delivery
- delivery of non-
conforming goods
- failure to deliver
- force majeure
- arbitration
- choice of law
3. Secondary Sales Agreement
- parties
- recitals
- acknowledgement of 
obligation to counter- 
purchase goods
- list of available goods
- specifications, descrip­
tion, quality
- quantity of counter- 
purchase
- price, terms of payment, 
guarantee thereof
- time period in which to 
fulfill obligation




Offsets have been defined as a range of commercial and 
industrial compensation practices required as a condition of the 
purchase of military related exports or commercial sales of defence 
articles and services. Military countertrade (as offsets are 
sometimes called) dates back to about 1961 when U.S. President John 
F. Kennedy (and before him President Eisenhower), facing increasing 
balance of payments deficits strongly urged West Germany to 
"offset" the foreign exchange costs of keeping troops in Germany 
by buying American weapons.
Today, offsets may include a wide range of industrial 




- documents, documentary 
transfer
- guarantee of quality, 
quality control
- right to inspect
- right to neutral surveyor
- determination and settlement 
of claims
- first party penalties, 
remedies
- second party penalties, 
remedies
- cancellation of first sales 
agreement




- choice of law
26 Weida, W.J.; Paving for weapons: Politics and Economics of 
Countertrade and Offsets: Frost and Sullivan Press ; New York, 1986
27 Treverton, G.F.? Economics and Security in the Atlantic 
Alliance. Survival Volume XXVI No. 6; Nov./Dec., 1984 p.18
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sub-contractor production and buy-backs. The economic arguments 
against offsets are similar to those made against countertrade in 
general. The arguments for them are persuasive. Since there is 
no free market in the supply of arms and that external restrictions 
are present all the time, it makes sense for Governments to be 
involved in offset trading. The argument further states that it 
would seem to be in the best interest of countries with large 
armament industries to foster bilateral relations with their arms 
customers. The experience of these countries has been that without 
offsets there would hardly be any military export sales.
The U.S. and Canada did two separate studies in 1984 on 
countertrade, particularly offsets. The U.S. study covered 520 
corporations with export sales in 1984 of $127 billion. About $7.1 
billion of that total was affected by countertrade, 80% of which 
were offsets of military and aerospace products (approx. $2.8 
billion). The Canadian study found at least 2 - 3  percent export 
sales involved countertrade. The value of the transactions 
including offsets increased eight times between 1980 and 1984. 
Figure 4 below illustrates an offset deal. r
No
Offsets not offeredÍ
Auction or *| 
bargaining for terms
[Offsets * ~ |necessaryforjsale












Intervention \  
through: \
(1) Exemptions to V, 
TOP* and Tech transfer's, 
for Co-production/ \  
Licenced Production
(2) Exemption to Buy- 




V ----------------------------------------I Offsets Not Offered
F ig . 4
The Offset Decision Process
Weida, W.J.; Paving for weapons: Politics and Economics of 
Countertrade and Offsets. Frost and Sullivan Press, New York, 1986
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Réference was made at the beginning of this study to the 
growth of joint venture operations by China in preference to 
traditional countertrade practices. A number of other developing 
countries with large resource endowments have also been involved 
in numerous joint venture operations - Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil, 
India and Algeria. These countries prefer joint ventures to 
straight foreign direct investments, especially if the sector 
concerned is vitally important to their economies.
Many joint venture agreements entail the transfer of 
technology to a trading partner in exchange for large contracts for 
turnkey plants. The technology transfer could be in the form of 
licensing, joint production of parts and sub-contracting. The 
contract that facilitates the deal ensures the second party's right 
to transfer technology, its right to use the company's brand name 
and its right to distribute in certain markets. The supplier of 
the technology exercises major control over manufacturing and 
marketing.
For developing countries, joint venture deals involving 
transfer of technology have become extremely valuable. Having paid 
high and unwarranted prices for capital goods and technology in the 
past, they now wish to have direct assistance in marketing and 
production. Countertraders are becoming involved in this process. 
Recently, Scandanavian Trading Company (STC) formed SCANOL, a joint 
venture with the Colombian Shippers Flota Mercante Grancolombia, 
which is controlled by the National Federation of Coffee Growers 
of Colombia. The aim is to supply technology to increase Colombian 
coffee exporters.
There are many variants of joint venture deals. Developing 
countries have become sophisticated at them and are able to 
negotiate sound arrangements with both East and Nest.
Evidence Accounts
This practice refers to an arrangement between an exporter and 
an importing country under which purchases by the exporter are 
automatically credited against its sales. Evidence accounts are 
used to facilitate trade flows in counterpurchase deals or when 
there has been a significant increase or there is expected to be 
a significant increase in trade between two parties. Parties to 
an evidence account arrangement would normally open reciprocal 
lines of credit and exchange quantities of goods over a specified
Joint Ventures
29 Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications ? Sept. 1988 No. 65 
pp.25 - 31
30 •Leo G. Welt? Countertrade op. cit p.17
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period, usually lasting from one to three years, 
used for balancing accounts.
This period is
Private firms use evidence accounts in order to avoid having 
to negotiate a countertrade deal every time they make a sale to a 
country. There are some disadvantages with evidence accounts. 
They cannot be re-negotiated. Commitments to import are strictly 
adhered to. Monitoring individual transactions by the assigned two 
banks can be costly. Also, participating firms do not seem to have 
any incentive for increasing exports beyond levels set by the terms 
of the agreement setting up the evidence account. Finally, there 
is the risk that a party to an agreement might make large advanced 
purchases which might be less than the penalties provided for under 
the agreement setting up the account. Figure 5 shows how evidence
accounts operate.
" ICountry A W
Country A ï t Country B
Continuous Flow
evidence account of evidence account1goods t
Fig. 5
Switch Trading
This is the practice whereby a trading partner with surplus 
credit in an evidence account transfers his purchase rights to a 
third party, usually a switch trading house. The trading house 
then buys goods from the partner with deficit in its clearing 
accounts. These goods are then bartered several times by the 
trading house until goods are obtained that could be sold for hard 
currency. The hard currency earnings are then passed on to the 
trading partner with the surplus credit, less the trading house's 
discount.
31 Leo G. Welt; Countertrade op. cit
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A switch deal invariably involves "switching" from one 
currency to another, usually from a non-convertible to a 
convertible currency. Switch deals could be bilateral or 
triangular. The switch dealer, who is invariably in the centre of 
the transactions, is usually someone with access to hard currency. 
Switch deals are mainly for consumer goods or semi-manufactured 
goods. Capital goods are rarely included in deals. The goods 
involved are usually products that do not have a ready market.
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CHAPTER IV
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
The economies of the Caribbean countries, like those of many 
other developing countries, have been going through difficult 
times. Intra-Caricom trade has somewhat begun to pick up after 
registering about 4% for the last three years. The growth in 
exports has been dampened by economic problems in Trinidad and 
Tobago, the dominant economic force in the English-speaking region. 
With the exception of the OECS States, the availability of foreign 
exchange is a major constraint. Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and 
Tobago have instituted strict foreign exchange regulations in order 
to better manage their foreign exchange resources. This foreign 
exchange constraint and the need to increase exports and pay for 
essential imports has resulted in the use of countertrade. This 
section surveys the policies and practices of Jamaica, Guyana, 
Suriname, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago with respect to 
countertrade.
Jamaica
Jamaica is undoubtedly one of the leading countertrade 
countries in the English-speaking Caribbean. Institutionally, 
Government has set up a countertrade committee consisting of 
representatives from the Bank of Jamaica, the Jamaica Commodities 
Trading Corporation (JCTC), the Jamaica National Investment 
Promotion Ltd. (JNIP) and the Bauxite Trading Company of Jamaica 
(BATCO). All countertrade deals have to be submitted to the 
committee. BATCO and JCTC act on behalf of Government in carrying 
out all deals. As of the time of writing, the secretary of the 
countertrade committee is an official of BATCO.
The are no specific legislation governing countertrade in 
Jamaica. The countertrade committee has essentially a number of 
criteria that must be satisfied before a countertrade deal could 
be approved. These are:
a) that the deals must generate new exports;
b) that the barter aspects of any deal be done on the Jamaica 
value-added component of the goods;
c) that the goods or services traded be limited to those that 
Jamaica has a real need for;
d) that the deals must result in some form of employment 
generation;
e) that the deals must generate new investment.
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The last two criteria have not always been followed. This 
aside, the above guidelines or criteria represent the most liberal 
in all of Latin America. The guidelines do no carry penalty 
clauses or guarantee requirements. Use has been made of evidence 
accounts, escrow accounts, switch-trading and gòods-for-services 
barter.
Products made available for countertrade are bauxite, alumina, 
tobacco, gypsum, soya beans and off-season tourism. In addition 
to government-to-government deals, there are a number of private 
sector to private sector deals that have taken place. Information 
on these were hard to come by as transactions which at times could 
be intra-firm arrangements were not reported to the countertrade 
committee. The deal that is commonly referred to is the barter 
deal between the Jamaican government represented by BATCO and the 
U.S. Government represented by the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
an agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In this 1982 
agreement, BATCO agreed to sell C.C.C. 400,000 long dry tons of 
metal grade bauxite in exchange for 7,238 metric tons of non-fat 
dry milk and 1,905 metric tons of anhydrous milk fat. See Annex 
II for text of the agreement.
There are other deals that have been made. In 1980, a seven 
year deal was concluded for Soviet machinery and equipment and lada 
cars. In 1982, a deal between the Chrysler Corporation of the 
U.S.A. and the Jamaican government was also concluded. Again 
bauxite was exchanged for cars and trucks. In 1983, Guyana and 
Jamaica concluded a deal in which Guyanese rice was exchanged for 
Jamaican soya-bean mill rollers. At the time of the mission to 
collect data, there were two possible deals with Yugoslavia and the 
Peoples Republic of China that were talked about. The Yugoslav 
deal was for pre-fabricated houses and construction material in 
exchange for bauxite.
On balance, it would seem that Jamaica believes that 
countertrade has been beneficial. The country has had a severe 
foreign exchange crisis for many years now. In the past decade, 
the country has resorted to IMF credits several times. At the end 
of September 1987, total outstanding IMF credits stood at US $630 
million. Only about 23% of Jamaica’s debt was incurred on 
concessional terms. This means that Jamaica's commercial debt 
is staggering. The country needs to borrow heavily to finance its 
trade and service its external debt. In such circumstances, 
therefore any additional means of allowing trade to grow, 
particularly the bauxite trade, can only be good for the country.
J.I.Stone: A Survey of Trade Finance in the English-speaking 
Caribbean Countries: Report prepared for the UN Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean; April 1988.
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Countertrade has enabled Jamaica to make important in-roads, 
for sale of its bauxite, into the Eastern European market. The 
deals with the U.S.S.R., China and Yugoslavia have meant that these 
countries have now established trade links with Jamaica. Through 
the countertrade deals, Jamaica was able to bring in much needed 
transport and agricultural equipment.
A questionnaire was sent to the countertrade committee 
requesting detailed information on Jamaica countertrade (see Annex 
III for sample of questionnaire). Another was also sent to JCTC. 
As of the time of writing, no response was received.
Guyana
Countertrade policies in Guyana have undergone major changes. 
These changes were brought about after an extensive review of 
Government policy on countertrade that started in late 1986. As 
part of that change, responsibility for countertrade was moved from 
the Department of International Economic Co-operation (D.I.E.C.) 
to the Ministry of Trade and Tourism. According to officials, the 
review brought out the fact that Guyana was not benefitting as much 
from countertrade as had been previously envisaged. The view was 
expressed that most of their countertrade partners were more 
experienced in the business than Guyana was and as a result, they 
gained more from deals. What the government was now emphasizing 
was investment in order to exploit Guyana's vast natural resources. 
There was need to bring to the country technology and management 
resources from the Caribbean and elsewhere through joint venture 
operations.
In response to the questionnaire sent to DIEC in 1986, it was 
stated that government engaged in countertrade for the following 
reasons. Firstly, there was a shortage of foreign exchange coupled 
with lack of access to external credit facilities. There was also 
a need to off-set the country's official debts, to gain access to 
new markets to increase the country's exports, to acquire relevant 
technology for local manufacturers and to gain access to a valuable 
supply source.
The rationale for the above policy framework could be 
understood better by reference to some data. According to Central 
Bank officials, Guyana's medium and long-term external public debt 
outstanding at the end of 1985 was US $692 million, approximately 
three times its G.N.P. for the same period. External payment 
arrears, as of June 1986, came to US $827.5 million. This figure 
includes the US $126.2 million owed to the Caricom Multilateral 
Clearing Facility. Because of the severity of the foreign exchange 
problem, Government instituted an external payments deposit scheme 
whereby both state trading companies and private firms deposit 
local currency in advance with commercial banks for imports of 
commodities and services. By this means, Government is able to
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monitor both public and private commercial debts and ensure that 
there was sufficient foreign exchange to cover imports. In the 
light of this severe financial constraint, Government pursued 
countertrade.
According to information supplied to us, Government has used 
barters, buy-backs, counterpurchase and government-to-government 
arrangements. There is no mandated countertrade. Both state 
corporations and private firms engage in countertrade through 
"administrative persuasion". Much of government countertrade deals 
have been done by state corporations. The Ministry of Trade and 
Tourism acts as the focal point. Sometimes, the Ministry has had 
to use the services of external agents, notably the Crown Agents 
of the United Kingdom for the purpose of verifying the quality of 
goods being exchanged in deals.
At the time of writing, it was expected that Government would 
publish a paper on countertrade and in it would be guidelines and 
regulations as to how the trade should be conducted. This 
publication is not yet out. Prior to 1987, there were guidelines 
but these were never published. They were considered internal 
procedures which were followed by D.I.E.C. There is a formal 
countertrade committee made up of officials from the Central Bank, 
the State Planning Secretariat, the Ministry of Finance, Office of 
the President (Economic Adviser), and Ministry of Trade and 
Tourism.
The following selected data on goods exported and imported 
through countertrade were reported in December 1986.
EXPORTS
ITEM VALUE IN GYS
a) Peeled shrimp 7 , 6 7 5 , 9 1 8 . 1
b) Balata 3 , 1 8 1 , 8 1 6 . 0
c) Timber 1 , 1 5 5 , 4 8 7 . 0
d) Garments 3 6 1 , 0 0 0 . 0
e) Fish 3 3 9 , 1 0 5 . 2
f ) Bauxite 3 , 7 1 4 , 6 1 2 . 9
g) Rice 1 , 8 7 5 , 0 0 0 . 0
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IMPORTS
ITEM VALUE IN GYS
a) Foot wear 4,700,201.9
b) Motor vehicles and spares 1,762,409.9
c) Tallow 1,234,545.0
d) Spare parts (other than motor 
vehicle spares) 737,450.0
e) Electrical accessories 734,346.8
The official rate of exchange at December 1986 was GY$4.20 » 
US$1.00.
Source: Department of International Economic Co-operation
(D.I.E.C.), Government of Guyana.
The estimated value of all exports through countertrade by 
December 1986 was put at GYS22.283.200.00. The estimated value 
for imports was GY$18.864.429.00. The following are the countries 
that have had countertrade agreements with Guyana:
Officials at Guyana National Trading Corporation indicated 
that countertrade had enabled the corporation to avoid overpayment 
for imports. Also, since the corporation is unable to benefit from 
long-term contracts because of the country’s acute foreign exchange 
problem, countertrade has enabled it to secure vital imports in 
very difficult economic times.
At the Guyana Forestry Commission, important information was 
provided on deals. Brief references will only be made to them 
here. In 1986, the Commission made available 2,000 cubic meters 
of wood as part of a barter deal with Cuba. In exchange, Cuba 
supplied cement, steel rods and pharmaceutical products. In the 
same year, the Commission, through two private saw millers, made 
















for steel plates. The same arrangement was entered into with 
Curacao in exchange for sanitary and other toilet fittings. A 
private deal was struck between one saw-miller in Guyana for the 
supply of lumber to an Antiguan business in exchange for building 
materials.
Two deals struck with Barbados are worth mentioning. In 1985, 
a Barbadian company worked out a deal with SAPIL of Guyana by which 
SAPIL supplied the raw materials for the manufacture of cardboard 
boxes corrugated in North America by Barbadian investors in return 
for a franchise from SAPIL for supplying the Caribbean market. The 
other deal concluded in 1986 provided for Stokes and Bynoe, a 
Barbadian registered company to make funds available to the Guyana 
Pharmaceutical Company for the purchase of pharmaceutical products 
in exchange for Guyanese products (fish, shrimps). These products 
were then sold in the open market and profits went to repay the 
funds made available initially by Stokes and Bynoe and to liquidate 
the debt Guyana owed to Barbados under the Caribbean Multilateral 
Clearing Facility (C.M.C.F.).
Guyana's vast experience with countertrade is one that many 
others countries in the region could learn from. However, as had 
been noted earlier, Government's policy on countertrade has 
changed. Direct market sales are to be preferred at all times. 
Greater use will be made of the foreign exchange retention scheme 
which the Government had instituted for some time now to help 
export businesses enjoy the benefits of taking risks in the export 
market. For some state corporation officials, this change is long 
overdue. They have had some difficulty in the past in accepting 
directives from D.I.E.C. or the Ministry of Trade and Tourism in 
making available quantities of fish or other products for 
countertrade, when according to them, there were unfulfilled orders 
for direct market sales. The effect of this change of policy has 
yet to be assessed.,
Suriname
Countertrade in Suriname is a recent phenomenon. The country 
seriously considered it as an aspect of its external trade because 
of the economic difficulties that resulted from the suspension of 
Dutch aid in 1982. One immediate effect of the suspension was 
drastic shortage of foreign exchange. A high importing country 
like Suriname suddenly found itself unable to meet its external 
debt obligations. As a result, overseas suppliers became reluctant 
to extend credit on a long term basis. Commercial houses had to 
reduce their import requirements as the Central Bank was not 
prepared to readily make available scarce dollars and dutch 
guilders.
Although Government had decided to embark on countertrade, it 
had not developed any set of regulations or guidelines to govern
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the trade. There is no countertrade committee in Suriname. The 
institution that has responsibility for countertrade is the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. They have a supervisory role as they 
ensure that deals are in keeping with Government's overall economic 
strategy. All deals can be government to government, private 
sector to private sector and government to private sector. A 
Foreign Exchange Committee has been established and amongst other 
things it approves deals that involve the transfer of funds. The 
Foreign Exchange Committee is made up of representatives from the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
Central Bank. The Ministry of Finance's position would seem to 
have primacy over the other two members.
The law that governs countertrade in Suriname is the Foreign 
Exchange Law of 1947. There is provision in that law for barter. 
It would seem that this law is sufficient for the country's 
external trade transactions. Members of the business community, 
however, feel that it is too old and needs repealing. They argue 
that the country's political and economic situation has changed a 
lot and that these changes would have to be reflected in up-to-date 
provisions of the law that governs import and export trade.
Government officials did not seem to have any difficulty with 
the foreign exchange law as far as countertrade was concerned. 
They indicated that different ministries and state corporations 
had the authority to negotiate deals provided the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was involved at all stages of the negotiations. 
Officials at this ministry indicated three principles on which 
countertrade was conducted:
- that non-traditional exports will be favoured;
- that the goods imported under countertrade must be "basic 
goods";
- that where traditional exports were used, they must have an 
incremental value to direct market sales.
Two main products have been used in countertrade - wood and 
rice. No deals have been struck with Eastern European countries 
or China. Deals have been made with the West, with two private 
firms - O.N.Y.X. Trading Corporation, a subsidiary of the FIAT 
motor corporation and an equipment firm in West Germany.
Suriname's experience with the barter deal on rice was a bad 
one. The barter agreement in 1985 between the Suriname Rice Export 
Corporation (S.U.R.E.X.C.O.) and O.N.Y.X. provided for the delivery 
of rice by SUREXCO for a period of five years to ONYX. ONYX was 
to supply Suriname with several items including cars and equipment 
for agriculture and forestry. Problems started when Suriname 
supplied the first consignment of rice and had to wait for a long 
time before O.N.Y.X. made the first shipment of agricultural and
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forestry equipment. It turned out that the items ̂ supplied were of 
the wrong specifications. Furthermore, Suriname realised that the 
rice it had supplied O.N.Y.X. was being dumped in the same markets 
in Europe in which Surinamese rice had been sold for years. 
Surinamese rice was therefore competing against Surinamese rice at 
below market prices. In addition to delivering the wrong items of 
equipment, O.N.Y.X. failed to supply equipment to the value of the 
rice it had taken delivery of. Legal battles ensued in U.S. 
district court and án initial judgement was given in favour of 
Suriname to the amount of US $8 million. There are still 
outstanding legal problems to be resolved.
As a result of the above experience, officials at SUREXCO have 
pushed for direct sales to Europe and the Caribbean (mainly non- 
English speaking Caribbean countries). These officials have 
advocated stronger economic ties with CARICOM countries, especially 
Guyana. They mentioned the possibilities of setting up ¿oint 
marketing programmes to sell rice in the E.E.C market. Other 
officials talked about the possibility of Guyana sugar being 
countertraded for Surinamese edible oils.
The other product that has been countertraded in Suriname is 
wood. Approximately 14.8 million hectares (or 90% of the country's 
land) are classified as forests or natural vegetation. The country 
also has 22,000 hectares of plantation forests. Responsibility for 
managing this vast reserve rests with the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, particularly its forest reserve service. Timber 
concessionaires range from small individual loggers to large 
enterprises like Bruynzeel Company and Suriname Timbers Limited.
About 300 species of timber have been identified. Of this 
total, about 50 species are commercially viable. The local market 
for wood is very good and average prices have been put at four 
times higher than the world market price. This is due to heavy 
demand in the construction industry. The export market to Holland, 
French Guiana and Martinique is excellent. Data from the Ministry 
of Natural Resources show that these countries absorbed 25.9%; 
28.3% and 19.8% respectively of the 1987 timber exports from 
Suriname.
Given the excellent export prospects for wood, the Government 
has used countertrade to attract foreign investment in a sector 
that has unlimited potential. It is in this context that the 
Ministry of Natural Resources facilitated the conclusion of a large 
buy-back deal worth 16 million Surinamese guilders between a German 
equipment firm and SUHIM, a private saw-miller, for the 
construction of a large sawmill. Payment will be in the form of 
purchases of wood and wood-products to the value of the original 
investment. This is a good deal and more than makes up for the 
rice deal fiasco.
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In discussions with some Government officials, the view was 
expressed that there was need to put some order in the countertrade 
business in Suriname, both official and private sector 
arrangements. Private sector officials made a number of 
suggestions with respect to foreign exchange management, 
import/export policy and over-centralisation of economic decision 
making. Their comments were useful. The general view was that 
government should bring in the private sector more and more into 
economic decision making as this would facilitate a number of 
policy initiatives, including countertrade.
Barbados
Countertrade in Barbados is not an important trade policy 
instrument. The economy of this island state has been managed 
efficiently. Given this and the fact that foreign exchange 
constraints do not exist within the economy, there has not been any 
need for Government to pursue a countertrade policy. Institutions 
have been put in place to help finance the country's export and 
import trade.
The Central Bank of Barbados houses a Credit Insurance and 
Guarantee Department. This department was established in 1978 to 
provide both pre and post shipment finance for Barbadian exporters 
through the intermediary of the commercial banks. An export re­
discount facility was set up to boost non-traditional exports. On 
the import side, commercial banks and other finance houses have 
been generous with trade credits. At a recent meeting of an Ad hoc 
Group of Experts on Trade Finance, Transnational Banks and External 
Finance sponsored by the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 
and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
it was reported that the manufacturing and distribution sectors 
accounted for over 80% of total outstanding trade credits for the 
period 1976 - 1986. Further observations were made at the meeting 
that banks had no difficulties in advancing credits for imports and 
consumer loans. They were, however, cautious with respect to 
export financing.
Given the above arrangements, government officials feel that 
Barbados does not need official countertrade. This is not to say 
that the trade does not take place. Reference has already been 
made to two private sector deals with Guyana. The deal involving 
Stokes and Bynoe (Barbados) Limited realised about BD $12 - 15 
million annually. It was beneficial to the Government of Barbados 
in so far as part of the profits from the deal went to liquidate 
Guyana's obligation to Barbados under the C.M.C.F.
U.N.C.T.C./U.N.E.C.L.A.C.: Report of the Ad hoc group of 
experts on Trade Finance. Transnational Banks and External Finance. 
17 - 19 May 1988, Bridgetown, Barbados, p.20
34
Private entrepreneurs in the garment industry spoke about 
countertrade possibilities for both outer garments and underwear. 
Since the collapse of the Trinidad and Tobago market, garment 
manufacturers have had a difficult time selling their product. Any 
worsening of the plight of Barbadian manufacturers with respect to 
export sales might prompt them to consider syndicated countertrade 
deals involving several companies in order to make up for losses 
in the Trinidad and Tobago market.
Trinidad and Tobago
Countertrade in this country, as in some of the other 
countries reviewed in this study, has been going on informally for 
a long time. Private traders have been able to bring in goods 
(particularly fresh fruits, vegetables, fish and shrimp) from 
Guyana, Grenada, St. Vincent and other small islands, exchange or 
sell them for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods which are 
subsequently taken back and resold in these countries. In the so- 
called "boom years", the economy of Trinidad and Tobago flourished. 
Manufacturing activity was quite bouyant and so it was easy for 
private traders to obtain a vast array of goods. Demand for 
agricultural products was high and so the importation by private 
traders went some way in satisfying this demand.
Companies have also been involved in some form of 
countertrade. Much of the deals really have been intra-firm 
arrangements, particularly where transnational corporations were 
involved. Individual proprietorships have also been able to make 
arrangements for the exchange of goods between them and their 
business counterparts elsewhere in the region or in North America. 
Much of this trade in the past had gone on without government 
interference. At present, in order to comply with trade and 
foreign exchange requirements, these firms now have to disclose 
these exchanges.
Countertrade as practised by the numerous state corporations 
in Trinidad and Tobago is by far the most prevalent. Many of these 
corporations have had to develop close ties with foreign companies 
either for investment or marketing purposes. The close ties 
fostered many economic activities, including countertrade.
The practice of countertrade in this country can be divided 
into two periods - pre-1988 and 1988/9. Before 1988, the
Government undertook countertrade through its state corporations 
in order to increase the country's exports, to gain access to 
foreign markets and to acquire relevant technology for local 
manufacturers. In 1988/9, countertrade has been pursued because 
of serious foreign exchange constraints, the need to improve the 
country's balance of trade and to lessen the impact of taxes and 
tariffs on imported raw materials for industry. Government is
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presently interested in commercial countertrade, though in the 
past, it had engaged in some industrial countertrade, especially 
in steel and steel-products.
In respect of general policy guidelines on countertrade, 
Government concerns are the following:
Regulations will be developed to govern the trade. 
However, some flexibility will be followed in their application.
Deals will have to be approved as part of a package by 
an inter-ministerial body for this purpose. Ad hoc arrangements 
will not be encouraged.
Countertrade on a purely commercial basis will not be 
pursued. Deals will have to meet other criteria such as their 
consistency with Government's overall economic policy.
Government will desist from countertrade that simply 
supplied raw materials to the industrialised countries of the 
North. The products to be countertraded will be determined by 
Government at all times.
Government will be mindful of the objections to the trade 
by international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and GATT. 
Obligations under GATT will be fulfilled.
A countertrade committee has been set up to prepare a 
comprehensive national policy on countertrade. Its composition is 
inter-ministerial. Below is a listing of deals made in the recent 
past :
A counterpurchase agreement was concluded between the 
Iron and Steel Company of Trinidad and Tobago (ISCOTT) and 
SIDOR of Venezuela. This one-year contract stipulated that 
ISCOTT would purchase between 360,000 to 450,000 tons of iron 
ore billets from SIDOR at US$ 30 a ton. SIDOR, in return, 
would purchase between 240,000 to 300,000 tons of DRI from 
ISCOTT at US$ 100 per ton. This deal is estimated to bring 
in more than $ 21 mn. in foreign exchange.
An offset agreement was concluded between Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago whereby Guyana would supply Trinidad and 
Tobago with rice as payment to liquidate that country's debt 
to Trinidad and Tobago.
Recently, the United Bank of Trinidad and Tobago 
successfully negotiated the settlement of a debt owed by IBM 
World Corporation, Trinidad Ltd. to its parent company IBM, 
New York. Citicorp, New York, along with its subsidiary 
United Bank, located a buyer in Japan (a new market) for 
products from the Iron and Steel Company of Trinidad and
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Tobago (ISCOTT). The foreign exchange earnings from ISCOTT's 
products were used to settle the debt.
In 1985, with government's acquisition from Tesoro 
Petroleum Corporation of 49.9 per cent of shares in Trinidad 
Tesoro Petroleum Company Limited, a purchase agreement of 3.23 
million barrels of residual fuel oil to be delivered to T.P.C. 
over an eighteen month period was agreed upon. A similar 
arrangement was concluded with British Petroleum (BP) and 
Shell.
In a recent press statement, a senior government official 
indicated that Trinidad and Tobago's experience in 
countertrade was limited. He added, however, that Goverment 
hoped to devise a specific regime on the trade soon. He made 
mention of a study on countertrade currently underway 
involving several ministries and agencies. He noted that, in 
due course, a programmne will be issued to assist in the 
development of countertrade arrangements in order to meet some 
of the country's specific problems.
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CHAPTER V
A REGIONAL FACILITY FOR COUNTERTRADE
This last chapter examines the arguments for and against a 
regional countertrade facility. Before these arguments are made, 
a brief look will be made at two proposed countertrade facilities - 
one in Singapore and the other in Miami, Florida.
The Singapore Trade and Development Board set up a 
Countertrade Services Unit in 1986 to promote Singapore as a 
countertrade service centre. A feasibility study for an 
international currency and barter exchange has been completed. 
The aim of setting up the center is to boost trade which has been 
stagnant as a result of lack of credit by third world countries. 
Other reasons for proposing the facility are that it will create 
a new trade finance mechanism, provide an international market fon 
soft currencies and enhance the marketing of third world products.34
The Singapore Trade and Development Board has given incentives 
to eight international companies to use the services of the 
countertrade services unit. Included in the package is a tax 
holiday for 5 years for any shipping or financial transactions 
conducted through Singapore. In spite of the generous arrangements 
offered by Singapore, countertrade in East Asia has not shown the 
kinds of growth prospects it once did. Indonesia, which by far has 
had the most developed countertrade institutions and regulations, 
has cut imports severely in order to improve its balance of 
payments, since 1986, official Indonesian thinking has been more 
favourable towards "soft financing" than countertrade. In March 
1988, the Government abolished its purchasing committee and 
countertrade was left to the discretion of individual ministries.
Other countries in South East and South Asia such as Malaysia, 
Taiwan, India and Pakistan have shown great promises for 
countertrade. A number of the major trading houses such as BHP 
Countertrade Pte of Australia, Phillip Brothers of New York and 
Centro Bank of Vienna, Austria are using the Singapore facility. 
Since coming into operation in May 1987, BHP Countertrade Pte has 
carried out two countertrade deals for Malaysia, trading raw steel 
in return for steel products through Singapore. The countertrade 
grouping is also selling oil, steel and coal and other minerals 
into Eastern Europe and taking chemical products, steel alloys and 
other steel products in return. As a pioneer company in Singapore,
Finance and Development, IMF, June 1987
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business has been brisk for BHP Countertrade Pte. The company 
hopes to §§rn US $7 million a year from its countertrade 
operations.
The other facility that reference was earlier made to is the 
International Countertrade and Currency Exchange facility in Miami, 
Florida, U.S.A. This facility was authorised by Florida State 
legislation in 1984. The institutional arrangements were completed 
and approved in 1987 and the facility was expected to start 
business in late 1988. The facility was established with a view 
to providing service for developing countries with severe debt 
burdens. The facility will provide short term financing to service 
the exports of goods and spare parts to developing countries.
The I.C.C.E. hopes to have a wide developing country 
membership, together with a number of North American firms with 
established distribution outlets in hard currency markets. Also 
the facility promises to operate an evidence account system which 
would ensure that developing country export earnings generated by 
the exchange will be exclusively reserved to finance exports to 
developing countries.
As with the Singapore facility, the I.C.C.E will operate a 
soft currency pool which will be used to facilitate selective soft 
and hard currency clearing transactions among the exchange's 
developing country members. The "pool" will also have U.S. dollar 
denominated debt paper which will be used to support debt/equity 
or debt/commodity swaps for both members and non-members alike. 
The underlying factor in all this is to foster trade in the North 
American - Latin American/Caribbean region. According to the latest 
available information, the Miami facility is still being 
capitalized. Discussions are presently going on between the 
Exchange and the City of Miami regarding start-up operations.
Turning now to the central issue of this final chapter, it 
would be useful to review the arguments in favour of a regional 
facility and then examine those against.
The most convincing reason for a regional countertrade 
facility is that it would help promote intra-regional trade. This 
trade has been stagnant for some years, at the beginning of the 
1980's, as Caribbean economies experienced declining growth rates, 
high unemployment levels and double-digit inflation. Export 
markets dried up as demand for Caribbean goods fell, particularly 
in the metropolitan countries. Balance of payments problems ensued 
and it became necessary for structural adjustment measures to be 
adopted in some countries. Economic problems in Trinidad and 
Tobago further compounded the region's difficulties. Given the 
above economic problems, many countries have begun to consider
35Trade Finance. Euromoney Publications, October 1987, No. 54
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countertrade as a trade policy option. A regional facility, they 
feel, would allow for the exchange of goods and services among 
countries in the region.
Another argument is that a regional countertrade facility 
would permit trade to take place even at times when foreign 
exchange problems are severe. Countries with large resource 
endowments would be able to go to the facility for deals to be 
struck with both Caricom and non-Caricom countries. The facility 
would operate like a clearing house in much the same way as the 
C.M.C.F. operated a payments clearing system.
A regional facility would bring about closer links between 
importers and exporters in the region. Manufacturers associations 
and chambers of commerce would use the facility as an exchange, 
providing valuable trade and business information that their 
counterparts in the wider Caribbean region could use. The facility 
would disseminate information on deals, legislation, guidelines or 
policy directives on countertrade. It could also publish 
information on products eligible for countertrade.
Any facility set up in the region for countertrade would 
enhance the region's position as a major trading area. 
Multilateral firms, trading houses and countertrade specialist 
would prefer to deal with one major facility in the region on 
countertrade rather than have to deal with several agencies and 
departments of governments. The facility itself would ensure that 
competitive deals are not separately negotiated, much to the 
detriment of individual Caribbean countries.
The facility will bring together the various countries in the 
Caribbean, both Caricom and non-Caricom. This wider Caribbean base 
would be used to penetrate extra regional markets especially those 
in North America and Europe. It will also be used to further
enhance Caribbean trade links with Latin America, Asia and Africa,
particularly with countries in those regions that engage in
countertrade. The expansion into North America and Europe will 
provide a stimulus to North/South trade and that into the third 
world will contribute to the development of economic co-operation 
at the South/South level.
For the arguments against a regional facility, it is essential 
to look at the question of financing such a facility. Creating an 
institution similar to the Singapore or Miami facility could no 
doubt be costly. Member states in the region have been going 
through difficult economic times. Their existing obligations to 
international and regional organisations presently consume 
significant budgetary resources. No single Caribbean government 
is economically strong enough to shoulder the financing
responsibility of a regional facility in a manner that Trinidad and 
Tobago did under the old C.M.C.F.
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Closely linked to the question of costs is the administrative 
difficulty of co-ordinating different countertrade ageficies or 
departments in all the Caribbean countries, Caricom as well as non- 
Caricom. Wherever the facility is located, it would have to have 
good communications links with all countertrade departments or 
agencies in the various countries. Also, such a regional facility 
would have to have control over the physical resources that have 
to be traded. Through its local agencies, the facility would have 
to have ceded to it authority to decide on transportation, storage, 
facilitation, customs and excise matters. If the facility only 
provides a medium for countertrade to take place, then such factors 
would not arise. However, the authority of whoever is to manage 
the facility would have to be clearly defined.
Setting up a pure countertrade facility without any 
arrangements for a currency exchange would not be practical. As 
has been presented in the main body of this report, there are forms 
of countertrade that require the establishment of financial 
arrangements. The Caribbean is, in the main, a soft currency 
region and some clearing house scheme would have to be worked out 
to permit the settling of accounts. In reality, what would have 
to be set up would be an expanded C.M.C.F. that would incorporate 
non-Caricom members. Given the diverse financial structures and 
the growing external debt of countries in the region, there is 
little possibility of this happening in the near future.
A final argument against setting up a regional facility is 
that given the cyclical nature of the countertrade business, there 
is no economic justification for a structure to be established at 
a time when there is some doubt as to the long term viability of 
countertrade. Trade magazines and journals are certainly not 
conclusive about the profitability of countertrade. It is not 
common place to find serious recommendations for governments to 
pursue countertrade. Care has always been taken in the economic 
literature on the subject and in official government publications 
to give advisory opinions. A quote from a publication, 
Countertrader issued by the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry 
in July 1985 would illustrate this:
"Even at its simplest, countertrade can be a complex, 
expensive and uncertain mode of trading. It is fraught 
with pitfalls. In an ideal market, it would not arise. 
It is, however, growing, fast becoming a fact of 
international trade and cannot be ignored. Exporters 
need not be deterred by countertrade, but they must be 
prepared. With careful and imaginative planning, some 
exporters have been able to turn this undesirable 
necessity to advantage."
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The report concludes the official U.K. Government position as 
follows:
"The Government recognises, however, that there are
situations and markets in which accepting an element of 
countertrade can be the only way of securing export 
orders. It is a matter for the commercial judgement of 
firms whether the costs and risks involved are merited, 
case by case, and the Government has no wish to
discourage firms from exercising and acting upon their
market judgements. Whilst the Government offers advice, 
information and general guidance to exporters, it is in 
general not prepared to become involved in particular 
countertrade negotiations or transactions."
The above quotation is not necessarily applicable to all
Governments. The essence of it is that it points to the risks
involved in countertrade, acknowledges that the trade is a fact of 
international economic life and recognises the benefits that could 
be derived from it - a fair and reasonable conclusion.
1
9. JAMAICA: AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES FOR BAUXITE
BARTER AGREEMENT
Annex I
This Agreement is hereby entered into this 25 th day of 
February 1982, by and between the Government of Jamaica represented 
by the Bauxite and Alumina Trading Company Ltd. (hereinafter called 
BATCO) and the Government of the United States represented by the 
Commodity credit Corporation, an agency and instrumentality of the 
United States within the Department of Agriculture (hereinafter 
called the "CCC").
WITNESSETH:
Whereas. BATCO desires to enter into a barter arrangement with CCC 
under which BATCO agrees to sell to CCC 400,000 Long Dry Tons (LDT) 
of metal grade bauxite;
Whereas. CCC desires to enter into a barter arrangement with BATCO 
under which CCC agrees to sell to BATCO 7,238 metric tons of nonfat 
dry milk and 1,905 metric tons of anhydrous milkfat;




This Agreement represents a portion of a total transaction 
between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Jamaica for acquisition of 1,600,000 Long Dry Tons 
(LDT) of metal grade bauxite for the National Defense Stockpile. 
The principal purpose of this Agreement is to define the terms and 
conditions under which BATCO will sell 400,000 LDT of metal grade 
bauxite to CCC and the terms and conditions under which CCC will 
sell 7,238 metric tons of nonfat dry milk and 1,905 metric tons of 
anhydrous milkfat to BATCO. The balance of the bauxite (1,200,000 
LDT) will be covered in an agreement between the United States 
General Services Administration (GSA) and BATCO, which agreement 
will also contain provisions covering the transportation costs for 
the 400,000 LDT of bauxite covered by this Agreement. The total 
amount of bauxite to be acquired by CCC and GSA is 1.6 million 




BATCO will furnish the management, labour, facilities, 
materials, tools and equipment and do all things necessary 
and/or incidental to performance of the work described below:
Item 1 - Provide 400,000 LDT of Grade 2 metal grade bauxite 
conforming to the chemical and physical requirements 
of National Stockpile Purchase Specification P-5b- 
R, dated December 15, 1981 (referred to herein as 
"Specification"), except that in Article II, 
Paragraph A, the following is deleted:
Ferric Oxide Max: 20.0
Titanium Dioxide Max: 2.5
and the following is substituted:
Ferric Oxide Max: 22.0
Titanium Dioxide Max: 3.0
and Article II, Paragraph B, is deleted in its 
entirety.
Item 2 - Deliver the material listed in Item 1 to the U.S.
Goverment Storage Track No. 10 which is located on 
the Reynolds Metals Company facilities, Gregory, 
Texas.
Item 3 - Build, trim and shape the pile of material delivered
under Item 2 to conform to the following
requirements:
a. Toes of the piles shall not extend beyond the 
prepared pad on Storage Track No. 10.
b. Outside slope of the pile shall average 30 
degrees, but must not exceed 35 degrees.
c. The stockpile shall be built in lifts of a 
maximum of three feet per lift. The haul 
trucks will be dumped and dumped material 
graded with a dozer to form the lift. This 
method should achieve a density of at least 81 
pounds per cubic feet.
d. A berm four feet high shall be provided around 
the top edge. The bauxite used for forming 
this berm shall be moistened, compacted and 
formed up on the inside face to a maximum angle 
of repose.
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Item 4 - Provide a sampling platform located adjacent to the 
scale used for weighing the bauxite. The platform 
shall include a ramp or catwalk in order to provide 
the sampler access to the bauxite in the trucks. 
The sample shall be taken after the truck gross 
weight is recorded and before the material is 
unloaded. The platform and access ramp shall be 
constructed so as to accommodate various size 
trucks, and still provide safety for the sampler 
while being suitable for the purpose of sampling. 
A drawing of the platform shall be supplied to GSA 
for comment prior to construction. The platform 
shall be operational prior to commencement of 
deliveries.
Item 5 - Refurnish and maintain existing weighing station 
adjacent to the storage site. The scales shall be 
certified by a recognized scale company or State 
Weights and Measures Authority, at least every three 
(3) months or after major repairs to the scale.
ARTICLE III: DELIVERY OF THE MATERIAL
.1 Schedule
Deliveries of the material shall begin on or about July 15, 
1982 and be completed by September 30, 1982. A minimum of
150,000 LDTs to a maximum of 250,000 LDTs shall be delivered 
within each 30-day period beginning with the first delivery 
date.
3.2 Destination
Material will be delivered to U.S. Government Storage Track 
No. 10, at Reynolds Metals Company facilities, Gregory, Texas.
3.3 Notice
BATCO shall notify CCC, or its authorized representative (for 
Part A of this Agreement, the authorized representative shall 
be the General Services Administration, hereinafter called 
"GSA”), in writing not less than ten (10) working days prior 
to commencement of initial delivery. GSA shall be notified 
in writing five days prior to any foreseeable and subsequent 
reinstatement of delivery.
ARTICLE IV: INSPECTION, SAMPLING, ANALYSIS,
WEIGHING AND ACCEPTANCE.
4.1 Lot Size
For the purpose of weighing, inspection, sampling, and 




Inspection of the bauxite shall be performed or witnessed by 
a GSA representative at Gregory# Texas.
4.3 Sampling and Analysis
GSA will sample the bauxite at Gregory, Texas. Sampling and 
sample preparation shall be at the direction and expense of 
GSA. Sampling shall be accomplished as close as possible to 
the time of weighing of the bauxite at Gregory, Texas. 
Representative samples shall be taken from each lot. Samples 
taken shall be for the purpose of determining conformance of 
the lot to the requirements of the Specification. Procedures
and methodology for the laboratory testing shall be those 
described in Exhibit A-2.
4.4 Moisture Content Determination
One portion of the sample taken for moisture determination 
will be delivered to Reynolds Metals Company. One or two 
portions of the GSA sample shall be used for moisture content 
determination. The GSA sample shall be dried at a temperature 
of 140 degrees centigrade for not less than eight hours or to 
constant weight. The loss of weight shall be regarded as 
moisture. The percentage of moisture in the sample shall be 
subtracted from the net wet weight of the lot as determined 
in Paragraph 4.6 below, and the resulting dry weight shall 
be used as the basis for payment. The moisture determination 
of the GSA analysis shall be final on all deliveries and not 
subject to umpire.
4.5 Umpire Laboratory Procedure
BATCO may request that a sample be sent to umpire for chemical 
analysis of any compound failing GSA test analysis. The 
umpire laboratory shall be mutually acceptable to both BATCO 
and GSA. The average of the umpire analysis results and the 
results of either GSA or BATCO analysis, whichever is closer 
to the umpire results, shall be final and govern. For 
individual lots not in conformance with the Specification, 
only compounds that failed to meet the specifications 
requirements may be analyzed by the umpire. The cost of the 
umpire will be for the account of the party whose analysis is 
the farthest from umpire's results. If both are of equal 
difference from the umpire, the cost will be shared equally.
4.6 Weighing
Weighing shall be performed by an official weighmaster 
mutually acceptable to GSA and BATCO at the Reynolds truck 
scales located as close as possible to the storage site. 
Weighing shall be at the expense of GSA. Every truck shall 
be gross weighed prior to delivery of the bauxite to the 
storage area. The tare weights of the trucks shall be 
established periodically as directed by GSA. A complete
t
record of weights by scale weight tickets shall be made for 
each vehicle for each load hauled. Weight certificates 
listing truck weight data in tabular form shall be issued by 
the weighmaster. When a completed lot of material has been 
weighed, a certified weight certificate shall be signed by the 
weighmaster and attested to by the GSA representative.
4*7 Acceptance
4.7.1 If the analysis of the GSA sample indicates that 
the bauxite complies with the requirements of the 
Specification when considered on a weighted average 
basis with all previous deliveries, the lot shall 
be accepted.
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4.7.2 If any lot fails to comply with the requirements of
the Specification when considered on a weighted 
average basis with all previous deliveries, 
acceptance shall not be made for such lot until (by 
subsequent lots) the weighted average of all lots 
delivered shall comply with the requirements of the 
Specification.
4.7.3. If after 80 percent of the material has been 
delivered to the site, the weighted average analysis 
as defined in 4.7.1 does not comply with the 
Specification, all further deliveries shall cease 
until BATCO can show that the remaining 20 percent 
of the material will be of such quality as to bring 
the weighted average analysis of the site into 
compliance with the Specification.
4.7.4 The Notice of Inspection, GSA Form 308-A, shall be
issued by GSA after receipt of reports on analysis, 
weighing, and physical requirements on one or more 
lots. Acceptance or notice of noncompliance of the 
material tendered shall be made by GSA on Form 308- 
A.
ARTICLE V: CONSIDERATION AND PAYMENT FOR BAUXITE
5*1 Unit Price and Amount
BATCO will be paid as follows for the bauxite delivered to 
CCC.
Description Quality Unit Price Total Value
Bauxite 400,000 LDT US$ 32.50 Per LDT US$ 13,000.000
5.2 Transportation. Handling and Delivery to the Pile
BATCO will be paid by GSA for the transportation, handling and 
delivery to the pile of the bauxite purchased by CCC at the
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rates provided in Article VI, Paragraph 6.2 and Article X of 
the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States and the Government of Jamaica for the 
Acquisition of Bauxite.
5.3 Payment
Payment for the value of the bauxite delivered to CCC, 
excluding the cost of transportation, handling and delivery 
to the pile, as provided in Paragraph 5.2, shall be paid for 
by CCC by delivery to BATCO of an equivalent value of 
agricultural comodities as specified in Articles VII and VIII.
5.4 Barter Account
Upon delivery to an acceptance of the bauxite by GSA, the 
value of the bauxite accepted shall be credited to a "barter 
account" for BATCO. The value of each lot will be credited 
to the account upon determination of acceptance by GSA, as 
demonstrated by the issuance of a GSA Form 308-A. The "barter 
account" will be liquidated as specified in Article XII, by 
applying to the account the value of the agricultural
commodities delivered to BATCO in accordance with Part B of 
this Agreement.
5.5 Invoices
5.5.1 An invoice shall be submitted weekly by BATCO to GSA 
covering the quantity of material to be delivered 
in the following week. The format shall be one 
acceptable to GSA.
5.5.2 Fixed Price
The unit price of the bauxite as provided in
paragraph 5.1 is inclusive of all costs of 
performance, including costs and cost escalations 
not known or not contemplated at the time this 
Agreement was signed, and includes (without in any 
way limiting thereto) all costs and costs 
escalations related to material, labour, 
transportation to the vessel, and testing, as well 
as Jamaican customs, duties, taxes, assessments, 
licenses and permits. The unit price of bauxite 
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